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GET READY TO BECOME A BOUNDARY 
ORGANIZATION 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
In January 2011 Éupolis Lombardia, the Institute for Research, Statistics, and 
Training, was established as a merger between three former institutes, each devoted to 
separate tasks: regional research, training and statistics. The combination in one new 
organization is hoped to bring about improved policy support, better human resources 
development, well-focused policy monitoring and surveillance, and productive 
networking with other policy agencies, non-governmental organizations and national 
as well as international research and education centres.  
 
Bringing about Éupolis Lombardia was an orginizational reform happening against 
the political background of an experiment in regional governance, ideologically 
inspired by the subsidiarity principle (Colombo, 2008, 2012). „Subsidiarity‟ is 
interpreted as a doctrine of “social responsibility that recognizes the priority of the 
smallest units in society, while censuring interference and excessive intervention by 
government” (Colombo, 2008:37). Although it embraces features similar to modern 
public management (freedom of choice of users, welfare services as people 
investment, quasi-market governance through accountability structures, etcetera), it 
claims to steer a prudent middle course between the Scylla of liberal anti-
interventionism based on market mechanisms and the Charybdis of socialist 
interventionism relying on state- bureaucratic structures (Colombo, 2008:40). 
 
SELF-ASSESSMENT AND EXTERNAL REVIEW 
 
In this philosophy on governmentality and institutional governance landscape,  the 
leadership of Éupolis Lombardia initiated a self-assessment process (Brugnoli & 
Colombo, May 2012). Reflecting on the present „functions‟ and „products‟ generated 
by its managers and staff, a lack of professional training in mainstream policy 
analysis and policy-oriented research was defined as a major stumbling block in 
realizing the benefits of the organizational merger (Brugnoli & Colombo, 2012: 5-6). 
Hence, the remainder of the self-assessment report sets out the what, who and when of 
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mainstream policy analysis, followed by listing required competencies and skills 
(Brugnoli & Colombo, 2012: 14-27).  
 
 
A small international expert workshop, on 27 September 2012, reflecting on the self-
assessment report, arrived at three major conclusions and recommendations: 
 
1. Link subsidiarity governance to modes of policy analysis. 
Modern governance and policy theory see modes and methods of policy analysis as 
situated and contextualized in political and administrative governance structures. 
Policy analysis as set of cognitive activities will only be successful if sufficiently 
attuned to its political and governance context. To the extent mainstream policy 
analysis is focused in “advice to the Prince”, it may be out of line with subsidiarity 
governance as it appears to require a much more socially distributed set of different 
modes of policy analysis. 
 
2. A window of opportunity for policy analysis in Italy. 
 
The present political drive for stricter budget control, citizen dissatisfaction with 
public service delivery, and the position of regional governments in Italy, and esp. 
Lombardia, appear to offer fertile soil for reintroducing policy analysis as a mode of 
governance. However, Italy should take advantage from the possibility to learn from 
errors and omissions in introducing policy analysis in Anglosaxon and some North-
European countries. Appropriate mainstream modes of policy analysis geared to 
budget control, accountability, and output/outcome evaluation, should be linked to 
more argumentative or interpretive modes of policy analysis that appear to align more 
with subsidiarity governance.  
 
3. Carefully think through the organizational implications 
 
Relevant implications for the institute originate from all the above listed 
recommendations, notably for the purpose of reaping the fruits of the organizational 
merger creating Éupolis Lombardia in the first place. This pertains to required policy-
analytic skills and competencies; it also regards organizational restructuring for novel 
combinations for more effective policy analysis; and, finally, it involves rethinking 
Éupolis Lombardia as a boundary organization.   
 
This means a reflection on internal boundaries in Éupolis Lombardia itself: 
boundaries resulting from the present division of labor between the three original 
institutes (research, training, statistics), and boundaries between different scientific 
disciplines represented in the present and future organization. In addition, we should 
look at external boundaries, between the knowledge and policy work done by  
Éupolis Lombardia itself, and its major end-users  and stakeholders (politics, 
administrations, associations, ngo‟s, citizens) in the multi-actor and multi-level 
networks making up the subsidiarity governance landscape of the eleven regional 
policy domains (Brugnoli & Colombo, 2012: 5). 
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PROBLEM STATEMENT AND KEY ANSWERS 
 
This essay will map the contours of rethinking Éupolis Lombardia as a boundary 
organization. It will sketch out an answer to the major question: 
 
What kind of strategic and organizational reforms are necessary for Éupolis 
Lombardia to embark upon the path towards becoming an excellent boundary 
organization? 
 
The answer to this question is threefold: 
 
1. Éupolis Lombardia has to clearly position itself in the multi-actor and multi-
level subsidiarity governance structure. 
2. Éupolis Lombardia will have to cover and master all aspects of hybrid 
management of the internal and external dimensions of a knowledge institute-
annex-boundary organization. 
3. In the next 3-5 years Éupolis Lombardia‟s management, assisted by external 
advisers and accreditors, will have to pay continued attention to elaboration of 
a detailed implementation plan for strategic and organizational reforms 
 
The next three sections elucidate and elaborate the answers. Therefore, the next 
section is devoted to the nature of boundary work, and broadly pictures Éupolis 
Lombardia as a boundary organization in an institutional landscape of subsidiarity 
governance. 
 
 
BOUNDARY WORK IN SUBSIDIARITY GOVERNANCE 
 
 
MULTI-LEVEL MODEL OF BOUNDARY WORK 
 
Since the days of Harold Lasswell policy analysis‟ major task has been conceived as 
to marshal the best possible (scientific)  knowledge for decision making on the public 
good. Hence, policy analysis is an instance of the meeting of science and politics – 
usually seen as two very different institutional spheres with their own cultures and 
practices, best kept separate. Thus, the relationship between science and politics-and-
civil society is often depicted as a linear process of knowledge transfer, dissemination, 
knowledge use or impact. Policymakers and politicians like to picture themselves as 
„on top‟ and call on the decision support services of scientists and experts as just „on 
tap‟. Scientists and experts rather see their own role as neutral, objective and 
independent advisers, who „speak truth to power‟. Both parties thus co-produce and 
highlight a sacred myth of their relationship, always used in front-office public 
accountability stories for journalists and the wider public.   
 
In so doing, both downplay the more profane, back-office narrative of the two-way, 
interdependent character of knowledge production and communication in public 
policymaking. In policy advice practice, the zones of transgression and engagement 
are inevitably fluid and blurred. Hence, the production of policy advice is not a neat 
separation and division of tasks between science (dealing with facts and causality) and 
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politics (engaging values and interests). Rather the production of policy advice is a 
form of boundary work. Boundary work can be more formally understood as the 
attempt by actors to define activities in contrast to each other through demarcation, 
and simultaneous attempts to find productive coordination across these boundaries 
through a division of labor that is stabilized because, while under constant 
negotiation, it becomes more or less accepted. Demarcation and coordination are two 
sides of the same coin. Concern for high-quality performance makes policymakers 
and experts mutually dependent; yet they have to guard their own identities and 
formal independence. Therefore boundary work is full of paradoxes and dilemmas; 
the relationship between science and politics will never be smooth and harmonious, it 
will always remain contested terrain.   
 
Synthesizing much of the theoretical and empirical literature on boundary work, it can 
be depicted as science-politics interactions in a multi-level framework or map (see 
Figure 1.) For the sake of this report,  elucidating Eupolis Lombardia‟s potential role 
as a boundary organization, it is already projected in Figure 1 . 
 
Figure 1. A multi-level analytical framework for boundary work  
 
From a micro-perspective, policy analysis on the boundary between science and 
policy practice is most clearly visible in research-and-advice projects around 
particular policy issues (like health and social services, or housing, or tourism in 
Lombardia). At meso-level, boundary work is carried out in boundary arrangements, 
a wide variety of organizational forms that straddle and mediate the boundary 
between professional-academic networks, networks of civil-society type of 
associations and organizations, and public sector en policy networks. Formal 
boundary organizations (Guston, 2001) are, in fact, just one type of such hybrid 
arrangements.  
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At the next-higher level, such boundary arrangements usually cluster around specific 
(sets of) policy problems and their typical issue or policy networks. These problem-
and-network structures (Hoppe, 2010) in turn are embedded in a political-cultural 
sphere (or „civic epistemology‟, in Jasanoff‟s terminology, 2005), i.e. the cultural and 
organizational practices by which politically relevant knowledge is selected, filtered, 
deliberated, validated or challenged (Lentsch and Weingart, 2009: 7); the 
characteristics of which permeate and penetrate science-policy interactions at all other 
levels.  
 
To present a comprehensive picture of the science-politics interface (in this case, 
regarding regional governance in Lombardia), then, means to understand boundary 
work at each level and the way these levels interact. Solid lines represent the primary, 
short- to mid-term causalities and tendencies influencing the nature of these 
interactions. Dotted lines show how „lower‟ levels may, in the longer run, have an 
impact on „higher‟ levels. To the extent policy actors can influence or, rather, 
modulate these variables, the entire system lends itself to modest and moderate meta-
governance or interpolable balancing. To address this meta-governance level, we 
distinguish between external boundaries or transdisciplinary positioning – the position 
of Éupolis Lombardia in the entire governance landscape; and internal boundaries – 
the disciplinary boundaries and interdisciplinary boundary work practices within the 
organizational set-up of the institute itself.  
 
 
EXTERNAL BOUNDARIES 
 
Ortwin Renn (1995) devised a useful set of ideal-types to characterize the political 
cultures governing interaction between policymaking styles and styles of expertise – 
adversarial (approximated best in the USA), fiduciary (like in Southern Europe), 
corporatist (like in Northern Europe, e.g. Germany) and consensual (like in Japan). In 
fiduciary cultures policymaking is confined to a close circle of „patrons‟ who rely on 
personalized relationships with particular experts to acquire scientific policy advice. 
Usually these experts are assembled in quasi-independent, bureaucratic, „in-house‟ 
expert centres, where they are supposed to enlighten the patrons and offer scientific 
background information for official decisions. There are no formal rules for citizen 
input or oversight of the advisory process. The entire advisory process is hardly 
constrained by any formal rules. Everything is oriented to producing faith in the 
system. All this is starkly different from an adversarial civic epistemology governing 
the world of policy advice. Here there is open conflict between policymakers and 
policy advice is acceptable only if it is produced by the highest standards of 
methodological objectivity of evidence. The entire process is as open as possible to 
public and professional scrutiny; it is governed by multiple procedural rules to ensure 
this.  
 
Now, no really existing system corresponds exactly to these ideal-types, and any 
system is in a continuous process of change. Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that   
the present position of Éupolis Lombardia in the regional governance system can be 
understood as centralized „advice  in a fiduciary system of political culture or civic 
epistemology. In terms of political accountability, ideological conflicts, electoral 
struggles and party politics override scientific input in public policymaking. This may 
be the case in many other countries as well (Webber, 1992), but in Italy the tendency 
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appears to be stronger. To the extent non-political expertise plays a role, from old, 
legal and budget expertises are clearly dominating governance advice and regulation; 
and it is self-evidently focused on governmental bodies only (see Regonini, 2012:4-
5). In the self-assessment paper, Éupolis Lombardia is described as provider of 
“technical-scientific support” for the Lombardy Executive Council and Legislative 
Assembly, as well as “government department and other regional agencies” (Brugnoli 
& Colombo, 2012: 3). In terms of Figure 1, this means that, at present, Éupolis 
Lombardia interacts with other government actors, administrative centers and 
policymakers – not with civil society type of associations and non-governmental 
policy workers. Moreover, during and after the expert meeting on 27 September 2012 
in Milan, from several independently given personal communications it was stressed 
that the research-and-advice activities of Éupolis Lombardia were strongly focused on 
‘advice to the Prince’, i.e. the president of the regional government of Lombardia – 
regularly bypassing his formal bureaucratic advisers. This may be due largely to the 
fact that the regional budget (mainly spent on health care, social services and 
transportation; Colombo, 2008: 33, figure 1) is still under national control for ninety 
per cent (Colombo, 2008: 32). It may also have to do with an effort to counterbalance, 
at central government level, the weight of legal and financial-budgetary advice with 
policy and management advice. 
 
This may testify to the political salience and stature of Éupolis Lombardia‟s role as 
policy adviser and boundary organization, yet this position is not without its problems 
in the longer run.  
 
First, it is questionable if „in-house‟ boundary work with merely governmental 
policymakers is sufficiently in line with the subsidiarity philosophy of 
governmentality espoused as typical for the Lombardian governance style. At first 
glance, subsidiarity governance implies policy-analytic capacity not only to be 
centralized at presidential level, or even politically distributed among several 
governmental policymakers. It appears to imply  embedded and socially distributed 
policy analysis as multi-actor policy support/facilitation for civil society organizations 
and associations. Or, the capacity to organize and manage „mini-public‟ deliberative 
policy exercises of small groups of citizens; followed by qualitative or interpretive 
modes of policy analysis in order to „abduct‟ more centralized policy initiatives or 
adjustments from such mini-public exercises. But this is a question for the 
contributions of Parsons and Colebatch, and therefore will not be treated here beyond 
these preliminary remarks. 
 
Second, although in many countries (e.g. the Netherlands) parliament relies for its 
needs to expert knowledge on the same „in-house‟ knowledge institutes and boundary 
organizations as the government, this apparently „efficient‟ arrangement is more and 
more questioned. In most cases, executive requests for expertise far outnumber and 
outweigh legislative requests; heavily contributing to the information asymmetries 
between executive and legislative powers in government. In Italy/Lombardia, the 
problem may be exacerbated by the fact that parliamentarians will habitually rely on 
legal and budget expertise, and less on policy expertise for strategic decisionmaking 
and management expertise to control and oversee the implementation of policy 
programs and projects. 
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Third, to the extent Lombardian subsidiarity relies on management/policy techniques 
of benchmarking, democratic experimentalism (Sabel and Zeitlin), performance 
measurement, and oversight functions in accountability systems, it is questionable 
whether all these functions could be served (as seems to be the case now, Brugnoli & 
Colombo, 2012:3) by one and the same boundary organization. 
 
The conclusion here can be limited to raising a fundamental question: is it a good idea 
to centralize policy-analytic capacity in one boundary organization if the subsidiarity 
style of governmentality and governance suggests that not one, but many boundaries 
are involved in securing productive policy coordination? More specifically: 
 
a. Can there be one boundary organization that provides scientific-technical 
policy advise and support to both governmental policymakers and 
nongovernmental and civil-society-based policy workers? If the answer is yes, 
how should Éupolis Lombardia be (re-)organized so as to credibly serve two 
very different „masters‟?  
b. Can there be one boundary organization that serves the knowledge interests of 
both executive and legislative? Practice in most countries sees parliaments 
strengthening their capacities for marshalling expert knowledge. How does 
Éupolis Lombardia serve legislative knowledge interests now; and should this 
be improved? 
c. Can there be one boundary organization that both advises the central 
government on strategic policy design, and assists other more decentralized 
governmental bodies to implement and manage those policies; and, in 
addition, monitors, evaluates and benchmarks those policies for the purpose of 
adjusting/terminating public services delivery? 
 
 
MANAGING EXTERNAL BOUNDARIES UNDER NEO-COPORATISM: THE 
EXAMPLE OF THE DUTCH PLANNING BUREAUS 
 
In neo-corporatist arrangements, a restricted set of a policy sector‟s main actors are 
formally accredited to enter the arena for policymaking. In now stronger, than weaker 
forms, neo-corporatist decision-making has always been present in the Netherlands, 
mostly in socio-economic policymaking. In these fluctuating modes, institutionalized 
expertise takes one of two forms. First, formally accredited actors mobilize their own 
expertise. In more technical negotiations, for example on health insurance schemes, 
experts like university professors may even represent actors, for example patients. 
This pattern dominated the old system of Dutch national advisory councils. In the 
second form, experts delineate the playing field for neo-corporatist negotiations 
among the actor‟s representatives. They wave a flag whenever the negotiation game 
exceeds known budgetary constraints, or when, say, projections of next year‟s 
economic growth become unrealistically high. This second pattern is to be found most 
prominently in the Dutch planning bureaus. 
 The Dutch neo-corporatist tradition of ruling by consensus among an elite of 
relevant actors – the model of recognized employer organizations and labor unions 
expanded to other sectors of the society – led to an unchecked growth of the number 
of such councils. In the 1970s and 80s numerous reports advocated a reduction in 
their number (over 400 in 1976) and the creation of some order. Meanwhile, the 
nature of expertise in the councils professionalized, in the sense that representation of 
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interests gradually but significantly shifted to interest-cum-knowledge representation. 
In 1997 the Ministry of the Interior both initiated the new framework law for advisory 
bodies, and abolished nearly all of the existing one. Only eleven general advisory 
councils were left, and seven more technical ones. The Socio-Economic Council 
excepted – as backbone of the neo-corporatist regime in socio-economic policy – all 
advisory councils were now considered expert councils. Another reorganization 
principle was that councils were to become less specialist and more generalist, 
covering more than one policy field. However, in practice the logic of diverse 
government departments, each with its own professional strongholds, style of 
operation, and governance networks, proved stronger than the logic of legal 
reorganization. Turning the logic of performance measurement into a tool for 
disciplining the advisory councils and planning bureaus to deliver more actionable 
and instrumental advice, in 2009 there followed a second round of shrinking expert 
policy advice. Top-level civil servants and ministers desired to get rid of too much 
unsolicited, strategic advice emerging from the (modest) scope of advisory councils to 
set their own agendas (Hoppe, 2008). This time even one planning bureau, the 
National Bureau for Spatial Research (RPB), was eliminated and amalgamated with 
the Environment and Nature Planning Bureau (PBL). 
 This brings us to the second mode of institutionalized expertise under neo-
corporatism, the planning bureaus (see also Halffman, 2009). Different from 
suspicions raised by their being called „planning‟ bureaus, these knowledge institutes 
are not involved in planning the economy or social service provision through state-
controlled resource allocation. They provide government departments with 
assessments of states of affairs and of future developments in their policy sectors and 
relate these to policy options. Although each of the three presently functioning 
planning bureaus (Center for Economic Policy Analysis or CPB; the Netherlands 
Institute for Social Research or SCP; the Netherlands Environmental and Nature 
Bureau or PBL) are formally agencies at arm‟s length of government but answering to 
departments whose ministers bear political responsibility for their finances and 
research agenda, through skilful performance of independence and political neutrality 
and fairness “they can provide policy makers with knowledge which is considered 
reliable and neutral to an extraordinary degree.” (Halffman, 2009: 41).  
 However, independence clearly has its limits, acknowledged by the planning 
bureaus themselves. The CPB, the oldest, most prestigious one, has close 
relationships with civil servants of the ministries of Economic Affairs and Financial 
Affairs, often with shared training in economics, econometrics, or accountancy, and 
career patterns that switch between the department and planning bureau” (Halffman, 
2009:48). The central mission of the CPB is to discipline politics in terms of 
budgetary constraints and sound economic science. The other planning bureaus were 
actually modelled after the CPB, as other departments mobilized their own knowledge 
and expertise. The environmental planning bureau, with experts from many more 
different disciplines, is also engaged in quantitative monitoring of policy instruments 
and impacts, and modelling the relationship between them. But it has as a mission to 
monitor and remind the government of its commitments and promises in 
environmental policy. Where the CPB is willing to negotiate unexpected 
developments and resulting policy uncertainties with civil servants, and will never 
question intended government policy, the MNP experts insist on their scientific 
independence in defining uncertainties and are far less willing to uncritically accept 
government environmental policy (De Vries, 2008). The SCP is concerned with 
description and assessment of current conditions in society, and less with projections 
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of trends and future developments. Like CPB, the SCP prefers numbers and 
calculations as input for its interpretative expertise about what is happening in Dutch 
society, and instrumental advice which follows dominant policy frames without 
questioning them (e.g. Scholten, 2008, on integration policies). 
Nevertheless, in spite of their devotion to „serviceable truth‟, the planning 
bureaus‟ status in the Dutch polity is exceptionally commanding. The degree of 
acceptance by government and most policy actors of assessments as reliable, 
independent and for all practical purposes „uncontested‟ is remarkable. Even political 
parties now routinely submit their election manifestoes to the CPB and PBL for a 
calculation (“doorrekenen”) and assessment of the likely outcomes, reported by these 
institutes to the media and the voters as school report marks (Huitema, 2004). As 
such, planning bureaus occupy positions of obligatory passage points for Dutch 
politics that would be considered unacceptably technocratic in most other democratic 
countries.  
There appears to be a  contradiction here. The planning bureaus are producers 
of serviceable truths and instrumental advice for various government departments that 
promote their different policy agendas in the normal turf fights over government 
policy. In spite of being ‘on tap’ to policymakers in neo-corporatist governance 
networks and culture, frequently it looks like they are ‘on top’: they rationalize 
political debate, enforce budgetary constraints (even on political parties before 
elections), and contribute to transparent accountability for the government‟s policy 
performance. They manage to do this because of a number of reasons. They are in a 
privileged position regarding access to (government) data and calculative resources 
(user-oriented modelling; e.g. Van Egmond and Zeiss, 2010; Petersen, 2006). They 
successfully exploit the image and rhetoric of numbers as objective and neutral. They 
not only discipline the policymakers, but are also mobilized by the policymakers 
themselves to discipline each other. Their most important political function for a neo-
corporatist polity may well be in creating a shared definition of reality without which 
accommodation of policy conflicts through negotiation would be near impossible 
Halffman (2010:54). In other words, the advisory councils and especially the planning 
bureaus are a bulwark against „fact-free politics‟. Even unstructured problems are 
turned into structured or moderately structured problems with supposed value and 
goal consent. 
Both in the advisory councils and through the planning bureaus the neo-
corporatist logic of interest-cum-knowledge representation has changed into one of 
representation of the issues and the state of „relevant‟ knowledge. This does not mean 
that the barriers to policy access to just a handful of major policy players, typical for 
neo-corporatist politics, has disappeared. Rather, experts have been repositioned in 
such a way that especially the executive has stronger leverage to break through 
corporatist deadlocks.  
 
 
 INTERNAL BOUNDARIES 
 
The present form of Éupolis Lombardia,  a merger of three formerly separate 
institutions, is the result of combined powering and puzzling in Lombardian politics. 
Next to an obvious political drive for more regional autonomy (powering), it requires 
a considerable leap of faith in expertise (puzzling) to lump together in one 
organization three such very different knowledge functions for very different end-users 
(cf. Dunn & Holzner, 1988): 
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- Research-and-advice for regional and sub-regional governmental 
policymakers as end-users (knowledge interpretation and use); 
- Statistics and regional observatories (fact production and statistical analysis), 
so far vertically tied into national statistical systems for national audiences; 
but obviously to be made more usable for regional (strategic and 
implementation/management) end-users as well; 
- Regional administrative capacity building through human resource 
development and training/teaching (knowledge storage and transfer) for high-
level management in regional government, policing, health management, and 
civil protection.  
 
Maybe the underlying thought is to use this window of opportunity for re-introducing 
policy analysis in Italy (see papers by professors Regonini, Rugge, and Secchi) to 
concentrate all relevant policy-analytic and public management knowledge under one 
organizational umbrella? As a way of creating enough „mass and focus‟ around policy 
analysis to successfully challenge the still dominant influence of legal and (public) 
financial expertise in bureaucratic advice? In that case, some caveats are necessary, 
resulting from the many disciplinary boundaries now conjoined in Éupolis 
Lombardia
1
.  
 
The general organizational solution to the multi- and interdisciplinarity problem is in 
managing  Éupolis Lombardia as a matrix organization. However, selecting key 
competencies around the substance of particular policy products is a relatively minor 
problem. E.g., it is rather self-evident that statisticians will be part of almost any 
project (see also Table 1 in Brugnoni & Colombo, 2012:13). But statisticians who 
proactively and productively cooperate with strategic policy analysts are not 
necessarily the same statisticians who do a good job at supporting projects in which 
performance measurement, benchmarking, or risk analysis (for public health, or civil 
protection) is pivotal.  
 
Another stumbling block maybe the stark differences between the trained attitude of 
scholars in dealing with knowledge interpretation in policy analysis as opposed to fact 
production and statistical analysis, and the teachers/trainers adept in knowledge 
storage and dissemination. Tellingly, the term „boundary work‟ was coined by 
Thomas Gieryn (1983) for the purpose of analyzing how scientists demarcate and 
defend the integrity of their own turf against both non-scientists and scientists from 
other disciplines.
2
 E.g. teachers/trainers and statisticians tend to see (policy) problems 
as structured and therefore amenable to a predefined set of doable and teachable 
professional solution techniques. Well-trained policy analysts are aware of the open or 
unstructured or only moderately structured nature of policy problems; hence, they are 
more willing to spend time at problem finding and looking for alternative, sometimes 
                                                 
1
 This paper cannot go into the question what kinds of new expertise are needed for Éupolis Lombardia 
to cover the full spectrum of contemporary modes of mainstream and interpretive policy analysis and 
different modes of public management; and how this capacity can be developed. That is the topic of 
other contributions, e.g.  by Park and Howlett.  
2
 For the Netherlands, Annick de Vries (2008) has shown that the lack of advisory impact of the 
Environmental and Nature Agency (MNP) as compared to the Center of Economic Policy Analysis 
(CPB) was at least partially due to the fact that the former is made up of scholars from very different 
disciplines who find it difficult to cooperate, and are reluctant do engage in policy-analysis, whereas 
the latter is made up of a homogeneous set of economists and econometricians trained for economic 
policy analysis. 
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non-traditional ways of problem solving, using a wide array of possible methods and 
techniques (Lasswell, 1970; Hoppe, 2010).  
 
As Brugnoli and Colombo already observed, however, even the scholars who are 
working in the strategic policy-analytic wing of  Éupolis Lombardia lack thorough 
training as (mainstream) policy analysis and public management. Not to mention that 
the spectrum of modern modes of policy analysis is much broader than what is being 
taught in mainstream US policy analysis: it also includes the different strands of 
interpretive policy analysis for mapping competing policy frames and belief systems 
of policy actors (Yanow, 1999; Fischer and Gottweiss, 2011), risk analysis (for public 
safety, transportation, infrastructure and environmental protection, but also for legal 
and financial risks), health (technology) assessment, benchmarking and performance 
measurement and other forms of accountability in public management work.   
 
The key to success is productive coordination between all these divergent disciplines 
and subdisciplinary streams in projects run by the same organization. In the literature 
on boundary work and boundary organizations this topic is treated under the label of 
hybrid management.   
 
 
 
HYBRID MANAGEMENT FOR BOUNDARY 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Boundary organizations are by definition hybrids in which political and scientific 
activities are contained, and sufficiently interwoven to make a clear division of labor 
an impossibility. Given the naturally self-defensive or demarcation tendencies of 
politics/policy on the one hand, and different scientific disciplines on the other, 
managing such hybrid organizations is a tough challenge. This section will briefly 
outline the major dimensions of hybrid management. Given the author‟s limited 
knowledge of the details of Éupolis Lombardia as an organization, it is not the 
intention of this section to go beyond a list of topics to be covered, only occasionally 
illustrated by its detailed implications. This would be the task for a detail 
implementation planning (see final section). 
 
 The first managerial challenge, of course, is to create a management structure that 
genuinely reflects the hybrid character of the organization itself. This requires shaping 
dual accountability and dual membership. The second managerial challenge is to work 
out an accepted,but flexible division of labor around a number of typical boundary 
objects, as template for working routines and reflexivity of the organization. Finally, 
the managerial challenge is to pay continued high-level attention to issues of meta-
governance and capacity building. 
 
 
DUAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
The management of boundary organizations needs dual accountability structures to 
both representatives of politics and of science. They need accountability to politics for 
the sake of legitimacy and salience or political robustness; and to science for the sake 
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of epistemic quality and credibility. In discursive balancing acts, easier communicated 
in fiduciary than in adversarial political cultures and civic epistemologies, they have 
to define a stable and acceptable mission for their organization. All activities of the 
boundary organization are continuously tested on alignment or compliance with this 
overall mission statement. 
 
Usually this means to have a relatively small (5 – 9 members) executive board 
composed of representatives from politics, major governmental users (government 
departments, other regional government bodies), a small selection of the major 
societal and economic stakeholders in the institution as such, and, of course, from 
science (universities, other relevant research or educational bodies). 
 
Next to a small executive board, many boundary organizations have a larger advisory 
board (see e.g. Lentsch &Weingart, 2009; 2011). It is larger because the 
representation of all stakeholders can and should be more comprehensive. In the case 
of Éupolis Lombardia a careful coverage of governmental and non-governmental 
stakeholders in the regional subsidiarity governance structure is called for.  
 
The management is held accountable for the annual and (preferably) longer term 
budget, (multi-)annual work plans, and major projects the organization initiates or 
will be engaged in.   
 
In a number of countries it has become customary to invite „peers‟  from related 
boundary organizations or knowledge institutes to review and benchmark one‟s own 
activities over the past, say, 3 – 5 years. Such ad-hoc review  committees usually have 
an international composition, thereby adding an important comparative aspect to 
accountability. Frequently, these review activities result from or are the beginnings of 
professional communities of, in the case of Éupolis Lombardia, regional knowledge 
institutes of centers of regional policy analysis. 
 
 
DUAL MEMBERSHIP 
 
A crucial tasks for hybrid management in boundary organizations is to see to dual 
membership. People from both the political/policy world and the scientific sphere 
should be represented and take part in the organization‟s activities. A good example is 
the production and consultation processes preceding the publication of the politically 
very sensitive Dutch government‟s 2007 White Paper on Water Management and the 
Delta Commission‟s 2008 advisory report on „Living with Water‟. The blue ribbon 
commission was chaired by a former minister of agriculture and consisted of member 
with high political, administrative and/or scientific status. Another example would be 
the well-known International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). What is less well-
known about IPCC is that government-appointed scientists, diplomats representing 
national governments who are signatories to UNFCCC, NGO and business 
representatives interact in varying configurations in performing its major tasks of 
drawing up chapter summaries for policymakers (Shaw 2005; Petersen 2006). 
 
Recently, Dutch ministries resort to so-called “knowledge chambers” for ascertaining 
the appropriate scientific expertise in dual membership policy projects. Per issue or 
topic, lists of the best available current experts are produced and regularly updated. Of 
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course, such a practice depends on the willingness of scientific experts to engage in 
boundary work; a practice which itself depends not only on the individual scientists‟ 
inclinations, but also on the civic epistemology dominating a particular country, 
region, or, sometimes, policy domain or even issue (see e.g. Jasanoff, 2005; Hoppe, 
2008). 
 
 
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF CO-PRODUCTION OF 
BOUNDARY OBJECTS 
 
The major activities for which dual membership is required is the co-production of 
boundary objects. Expert advice or policy-analytic reports are good examples. 
Boundary objects can be textual, conceptual, mathematical or graphical in nature, like 
e.g. geo-spatial information contained in maps, indicator systems, econometric or 
other types of social and physical modelling, bi-annual reports, report series, 
evaluation studies, benchmark reports, etcetera. Crucial is that boundary objects are 
“plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the several parties 
employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites. They 
may have different meanings in social worlds but their structure is common enough to 
more than one world to make them recognisable, a means of translation. The creation 
and management of boundary objects is a key process in developing and maintaining 
coherence across intersecting social worlds” (Starr & Griesemer, 1989: 393). 
 
Boundary objects that immediately feed into budget decisions in the executive or 
legislative appear to be the best guarantee for successful boundary work. E.g. the 
Center for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) – in co-production with the National 
Center for Statistics (CBS) -  in the Netherlands produces two standard economic 
outlooks for both government and parliament; one in spring for preparing 
departmental budget allocations and as early-warning for parliamentarians‟ debates; 
and one in summer, containing next year‟s definitive figures and prognoses, and 
forming the basis for the annual overall policy review by parliament. Because of its 
authorative status for both departmental policymaking officials and their political 
masters, for MP‟s, for representatives of labor unions and employers‟ associations in 
the Social-Economic Council, as well as for university-based economist, these two 
reports are tremendously useful in reducing political transaction costs and enabling 
scientific input and review in the budget-making process (Halffman & Hoppe, 2005; 
De Vries, 2008; Den Butter, 2011). 
 
Thus, well-chosen boundary objects not only represent hybridization of political and 
scientific work in a very specific way, they also enable reflexivity about the quality of 
boundary work itself. Both stakeholders and scholars, in discussing boundary objects, 
open them up as hybrid products where scientific insights and practical, often 
politico-administrative constraints on timing or counting procedures (see Stone, 
1997), are intertwined, but deserve deconstruction and un-packing in order to 
critically assess and discuss tacit, often value-laden assumptions embedded in their 
construction.  
 
Boundary objects serve as the most specific forms of co-production of social-political 
and cognitive-scientific order in boundary work. As such they also serve as the most 
likely space for resolving the conflicts between the norms and criteria for political and 
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scientific practices. This frequently means confrontation, negotiation and mediation – 
the profane or back-office counter-part to the official, sacred and front-office 
presentation of linear interaction from science to politics. Experience shows that 
premature consensus-seeking and compromise-building are perhaps the most serious 
dangers in productive boundary work. They can only be avoided through 
deconstruction and reflexive analysis of the key assumptions contained in novel 
policy concepts and inscribed in promising scientific and technological developments  
This requires steps neither politicians nor scientists are necessarily comfortable with: 
the identification of critical scientists, counter-experts, visionaries, dissenters even; 
and sometimes confrontation of global and codified with local, less-codifiable 
knowledge. E.g. experts‟ model building for integrated assessment of options in 
environmental pollution abatement can be supplemented by parallel participatory 
assessments involving local inhabitants (Siebenbuehner & Barth, 2005).   
 
META-GOVERNANCE ISSUES 
 
Metagovernance of boundary work and boundary organizations involves cross-
jurisdictional, cross-level (regional – municipal – local) and cross-scale orchestration 
of distributed production of policy-analytic and public management knowledge. 
Particularly, it might involve coordinative action among several boundary 
organizations. E.g., in the Netherlands the four national centers for policy analysis and 
advice to the government formally coordinate their activities – both in the sense of 
undertaking shared projects, and in the sense of clear demarcation of tasks (Halffman, 
2009).  
 
Since major aspects of this dimension of hybrid management was already covered in 
the subsections above on external and internal boundaries, here the importance of this 
task is stressed from a quality of policymaking perspective. Metagovernance is 
essential to avoid the incrementalist seduction an all policymaking. Part of this 
seduction is the almost irresistable urge among politicians and high-level 
administrators for cherry-picking and venue shopping. Their political motives drive 
them to claim and assert problem ownership of projects with visible, easily 
deliverable, short term results („cherries‟). To achieve this, they steer policy programs 
and projects towards decision areas and procedures („venues‟) that will most likely 
realize the politically desired results without necessarily producing to much real 
change. They steer clear of decision areas and procedures that may produce politically 
„adverse‟ outcomes. In terms of intelligent trial-and-error learning, these political 
strategies lead straightaway into the pitfalls of incrementalist policy change: (1) 
misguided policy trials produce very expensive policy outcomes; (2) policy projects 
prematurely declared successful retain too little flexibility to correct errors; and (3) 
learning from errors becomes very slow, if not impossible. 
 
Against such normal political tendencies, the effective boundary organization engages 
in alert metagovernance. Metagovernance resists the bias inherent in cherry-picking 
by keeping alive a holistic picture of the policy problem. It counters venue shopping 
through careful design of procedures for deliberation and participation and by 
monitoring progress along these lines.  
 
CAPACITY BUILDING 
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The expansion and building up of specific skills and competencies for policy analysis 
and public management is dealt with by other authors. Here it should be remarked that  
organizational infrastructure for capacity building seems to be an important task for 
Éupolis Lombardia already. It delivers training, life-long learning education and 
focused seminars for personnel and top management of the Lombardy Regional 
Council, Regional Executive, other Regional Agencies (policy, civil protection), 
Local Authorities and Social and Health Services Management, staff of Non-
Governmental Organizations, and even for educational institutions. This extensive 
human resource development infrastructure could well become a key organizational 
vehicle or venue for disseminating policy-analytic and public management skills and 
competencies in regional governance in Lombardia.  
 
Here is should be stressed that especially the relationship with universities deserves 
attention. In these traditional bulwarks of scientific learning disciplinary boundaries 
are very strong still. If policy analysis and public management knowledge is to 
become a recognized interdisciplinary body of knowledge, with its own 
faculties/departments, publication outlets and professional associations in Italian 
academe, detailed arrangements for cooperation with boundary organizations like 
Éupolis Lombardia are essential. As a site for participant observation for interested 
professors, or as a site offering  internships for students, the institute could play a vital 
role in the institutionalization of policy analysis and public management in 
universities by offering a „safe haven‟ for interdisiciplinary work near political and 
administrative practice. Vice versa,  the institute could profit from available expertise 
and manpower at universities. 
 
 
CAVEAT: THE DANGEROUS DIALECTICS OF SACRED AND 
PROFANE COMMUNICATING ABOUT BOUNDARY WORK 
 
In any democratic polity, hybrid management, and especially the public accountability 
giving of boundary work is tricky. Decisionism, or political primacy, is the sacred 
norm to be upheld at all costs in presenting the boundary organization and the results 
of boundary work to parliament, the media and the larger public. Yet, as was argued 
above, worldly, „sordid‟ reality requires deviating from the sacred norm in everyday, 
profane co-production if boundary work is to be creative and productive.  In other 
words, science-policy interactions are continually endangered by a double bind: to be 
successful, you must do something that is formally „not done‟; the left hand has to be 
deliberately in the dark about the doings of the right hand. Swedish organization 
expert Nils Brunsson (1993) therefore speaks of „management by hypocrisy‟. Again, 
in fiduciary political cultures and civic epistemological systems like Italy seems to 
have, this problem may seem less urgent. Yet the Wikileaks and Climategate 
episodes, not to mention the mad-cow troubles in the UK longer ago and the present 
problems of the Japanese government around the nuclear plants after last year‟s 
tsunami, testify to the extreme vulnerability to credibility loss of regular science-
politics interactions.  
It may therefore be a good idea to establish a special communication branch in any 
boundary organization such as Éupolis Lombardia. Being able to deal with the old, 
written and new internet media is becoming more in more important – as Berlusconi‟s 
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long reign in Italy has amply demonstrated. Many boundary organizations an think 
tanks, therefore, devote more and more attention to their relations with the press and 
the media. One does not have to go so far as some US think tanks who devote up to 
half of their budgets on hiring communication experts for creating fancy websites, and 
writing executive summaries and press releases of any product of boundary work 
coming out of their organization. However, some systematic attention to the 
communication strategies, both towards government, stakeholders in subsidiarity 
governance, the general public and the media seems more than worthwhile. 
 
 
 
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Due to limited local knowledge of the author of this advice on Éupolis Lombardia as 
boundary organization, this report is rather abstract and superficial. It only scratches 
the surface of a topic that deserves treatment in depth by the leadership and 
management of the organization itself. At the same time, realizing how difficult it is 
in practice to monitor and critically self-assess one‟s own progress and performance, 
it makes sense to in a sense continue the outsider’s expert review initiated around the 
first self-assessment report of May 2012. A small group of external experts could 
annually assess progress made in implementation, and give advice on corrective or 
new reforms to be undertaken for a next year, on the basis of annual progress reports 
produced by staff of Éupolis Lombardia itself. It is not necessary that new written 
reports are produced. Assessment and advice could be given orally during a workshop 
in the presence of the organization‟s leadership. This would also guarantee genuine 
debate and dialogue on critical issues, that demand the productive mixture of local 
and more cosmopolitan knowledge about policy analysis, public management, and the 
workings of boundary organizations. 
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